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Abstract—We propose a new adversarial attack on frequency-
hopping based wireless communication between two users,
namely Alice and Bob. In this attack, the adversary, referred
to as Eve, instantaneously modifies the transmitted signal by
Alice before forwarding it to Bob within the symbol-period. We
show that this attack forces Bob to incorporate Eve’s signal
in the decoding process; otherwise, treating it as noise would
further degrade the performance akin to jamming. Through this
attack, we show that Eve can convert a slow-fading channel
between Alice and Bob to a rapid-fading one by modifying
every transmitted symbol independently. As a result, neither
pilot-assisted coherent detection techniques nor blind-detection
methods are directly applicable as countermeasures. As potential
mitigation strategies, we explore the applicability of frequency-
hopping along with (i) On-Off keying (OOK) and (ii) Binary
Frequency-Shift-Keying (FSK) as modulation schemes. In the
case of OOK, the attacker attempts to introduce deep-fades on
the tone carrying the information bit, whereas in the case of
BFSK, the attacker pours comparable energy levels on the tones
carrying bit-0 and bit-1, thereby degrading the performance.
Based on extensive analyses and experimental results, we show
that (i) when using OOK, Bob must be equipped with a large
number of receive antennas to reliably detect Alice’s signal, and
(ii) when using BFSK, Alice and Bob must agree upon a secret-
key to randomize the location of the tones carrying the bits, in
addition to randomizing the carrier-frequency of communication.
Index Terms—Jamming, frequency-hopping, cognitive radio,
convolution attack, wireless security
I. INTRODUCTION
Jamming is a well known adversarial attack on wireless
communication [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] wherein the attacker
overpowers the communication between a transmitter and a
receiver by injecting high-powered noise signals. Standard
ways to mitigate jamming include frequency-hopping (FH)
[6], [7] and direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) schemes
[8]. In the case of DSSS, a narrowband signal is spread
across a wide band of frequencies by using a spreading code
so that an attacker, which does not possess the spreading
code, will have its jamming signal rejected by the receiver.
In the case of FH, which is the subject matter of this paper,
the transmitter and the receiver synchronously hop across
several carrier-frequencies so that the hopping pattern appears
non-deterministic to the adversary. As a result, narrowband
jamming, i.e., jamming a specific carrier-frequency, cannot
guarantee performance degradation due to randomness in the
hopping pattern. On the other hand, with wideband jamming,
i.e., jamming all the carrier-frequencies, the effective noise
power injected on each carrier-frequency would be too weak to
induce significant degradation in the performance. Both DSSS
and FH are effective under the assumption that the attacker
is power-constrained. Citing these benefits, DSSS and FH
have found extensive applications in military communication
systems, and recently in many cyber-physical systems. While
DSSS and FH introduce randomness in the choice of the
spreading code and carrier-frequencies, respectively, introduc-
ing randomness over spatial orientation of the antennas has
also been explored as a viable anti-jamming technique in
communication involving highly-directional antennas [9].
With wireless communication being an integral part of most
cyber-physical systems, e.g. urban transportation, smart-grid
and other IOT systems [10], it is imperative to envision new
attacks [11] on such systems and provide suitable counter-
measures against them. Over the past decade, wireless com-
munication technology has witnessed enormous progress in
bandwidth-efficient physical-layer techniques that have helped
wireless devices achieve high data-rate. One of the prominent
areas rising in this space is full-duplex communication [15],
[16], [17], wherein a radio device can simultaneously trans-
mit and receive signals in the same frequency band. While
efficient hardware- and software-architectures have helped
full-duplex radios to achieve near-perfect self-interference
cancellation, there have been concurrent developments in
hardware implementation for low-latency processing of radio
frequency (RF) signals [23] in the field of systems security.
Aggregating the latest developments in the above areas, we
believe that next-generation cyber-physical systems ought
to assume strong attack models that employ state-of-the-art
wireless techniques.
A. Motivation
In this paper, we are interested in threat models arising out
of full-duplex radios that operate as hidden relays between
a transmitter and a receiver, as depicted in Fig. 1. Loosely
speaking, this threat comes under the well known framework
of man-in-the-middle attacks, wherein the attacker can manip-
ulate the transmitted symbols before they reach the legitimate
receiver. Although instantaneous modification of transmitted
symbols has been addressed to mitigate interference in wire-
less networks [12], [13], [22], such ideas have not been studied
as a threat to wireless security. An important question to
answer along that direction is: Are the current-day wireless
systems resilient to instantaneous manipulation of transmitted
symbols in the air? From the standpoint of practicality, major
challenges to instantaneous modification include (i) additional
processing-delay and (ii) additional path-delay, introduced
by the attacker. The processing-delay constraint restricts the
Fig. 1. Under the framework of Cognitive Radio from Hell (CRFH), the
attacker can modify the signal in any narrowband chosen by the two users
despite not knowing the hopping pattern. In the above figure, X(f), W (f),
and Y (f), respectively, denote the Fourier transform of the transmitted
passband signal, attacker’s random signal, and the received passband signal.
attacker not to make dynamic decisions based on baseband
signal processing of the received signals. On the other hand,
the path-delay constraint resulting from the attacker’s position
restricts it to be appropriately placed so that the forwarded
components reach the receiver well within the delay of one
symbol-period relative to the signals received from the main
path. In a nutshell, if the above two constraints are respected,
then, in principle, it is possible for the modified signals to
arrive at the legitimate receiver within the symbol-period.
We refer to such an attacker as Cognitive Radio from Hell
(CRFH). The proposed adversarial model comes under the
class of correlated jamming [14] wherein the jammer has full
or partial information about the transmitter’s signals.
B. CRFH Attacks on Frequency-Hopping
Our discussion in the preceding section indicates that the
processing-delay and the path-delay constraints may preclude
the attacker from executing instantaneous modification on
wideband communication due to small symbol-periods. How-
ever, on narrowband communication systems, such as FH
(wherein the bandwidth around the chosen carrier-frequency
is small), the attacker can potentially execute instantaneous
modification “in the air” due to relatively large symbol-
periods compared to the path-delay on the main path. This
has motivated us to study the effect of CRFH attacks on
FH systems. Particularly, in the context of FH, we note that
instantaneous modification of symbols is crucial to degrade
the error-performance at Bob, otherwise, any unintentional
delay introduced by the attacker, will result in a delay of
one symbol-period or more. This allows the legitimate re-
ceiver to evade the attack by hopping to the next carrier-
frequency before the delayed components arrive. Thus, to en-
force degraded performance from instantaneous modification,
the CRFH attacker on FH must respect the delay constraints
on instantaneous modification.
C. Related Work
To help translate the idea of CRFH attack to practice, recent
advances in the field of full-duplex radios [15], [16], [17],
[18], [19], [20] have shown that radios can be designed to
cancel their self-interference while instantaneously forwarding
the transmitted signals. In particular, [21] has showcased the
possibility of building radios with the capability of instan-
taneous processing and relaying. Recently, [22] has demon-
strated the effectiveness of instantaneous modification by full-
duplex radios to achieve co-existence in interference channels.
Also, [23] has showed that radio-frequency signals can be
processed and retransmitted in the analogue domain with a
delay of few nano-seconds.
The notion of modifying symbols in the air is also known
under the framework of reactive jamming [24], which refers
to the process of targeting selected packets in the air as it
allows the attacker to destroy specific packets and yet go
undetected. The authors of [25] have studied the feasibility
of reactive jamming by designing and implementing a re-
active jammer against 802.15.4 networks. Through the use
of Universal Software Radio Peripherals (USRPs), [25] has
demonstrated jamming attack with reaction time of the order
of microseconds in indoor environments. In [26], the authors
have addressed reactive jamming attacks where the adversary
is capable of picking packets based on real-time classification
of packets at the physical-layer. They have also proposed
countermeasures to prevent real-time packet classification
based on both cryptographic as well as physical-layer ideas. In
[27], the authors have proposed a technique to detect reactive
jammers on DSSS. The basic idea is to use statistics on attack-
free packets and then identify packets attacked from those lost
due to bad channel condition. In [28], reactive jamming on
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is con-
sidered, and an effective countermeasure based on Multiple-
Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) systems has been proposed.
Overall, inspired by the above works, particularly that of [21]
and [23], we believe that it is imperative for existing cyber-
physical systems to envision attacks that could arise out of
full-duplex radios capable of instantaneous modification of
transmitted symbols.
D. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are summarized below:
• We introduce a new adversarial attack, referred to as
the convolution attack (CA), on FH based wireless
communication. In this attack, the adversary, which is
strategically positioned between the transmitter and the
receiver, instantaneously multiplies the received passband
signal by a random baseband signal, and then forwards it
to the receiver within the symbol-period. Subsequently,
the forwarded signals will combine with the signals
directly received from the transmitter, thereby modifying
the information symbols in the air. One of the highlights
of the attack is that the attacker is able to perturb the
transmitted symbols despite not knowing the active nar-
rowband of communication. We show that the proposed
attack forces the legitimate receiver to incorporate the
forwarded signals in the decoding process; otherwise,
discarding them as noise is shown to result in conse-
quences akin to jamming. (see Section III). We also show
that the CA forces the equivalent channel between the
legitimate users to experience frequency-selectivity and
rapid-fading, in such a way that neither pilot-based co-
herent detection techniques, nor traditional non-coherent
and differential encoding/decoding detection techniques
can mitigate the attack.
• As a countermeasure against CA, we study the per-
formance of an FH system with non-coherent On-Off
Keying (OOK) as the underlying modulation scheme (see
Section IV). This mitigation strategy, although a tradi-
tional communication scheme, is tailor-made to handle
the threat model because switching-off the transmission
forbids the attacker from perturbing the communication,
while switching-on the transmission helps the receiver to
collect energy despite the attack. With large number of
antennas at the receiver, we show that the receiver can
opportunistically use the attacker’s signal to its advantage
to gather more energy for detection (see Section IV-A).
We show that OOK is an effective countermeasure if
the attacker executes the convolution attack on both
the pilot symbols and the data symbols with the same
attack parameters; this is because the threshold for energy
detection is computed using the received energy distri-
butions on the pilot symbols. However, if the attacker
decides to selectively attack only the data symbols and
not the pilots, then OOK is no longer an effective
countermeasure.
• As a second countermeasure against CA, we study the
performance of non-coherent Binary Frequency Shift
Keying (BFSK), a widely used modulation scheme with
FH in military application. In this form of CA, the
adversary instantaneously modifies the signal “in the
air” so that the receiver witnesses comparable energy
levels on the tones carrying bit-0 and bit-1. As a result,
this attack significantly degrades the error performance
at the receiver when it uses threshold-based energy
detection (see Section V). One the fundamental causes
for this attack is that although the carrier-frequency is
randomly hopped based on a shared secret-key between
the legitimate users, the locations of the tones carrying
bit-0 and bit-1 are deterministic upto one bit randomness
when the attacker observes the signal in the air. We first
show that this form of CA, when appropriately executed,
introduces error-floor behaviour in the error performance.
Subsequently, we propose a mitigation strategy, referred
to as Enhanced BFSK, wherein unlike the standard
frequency-hopping technique, the tones carrying bit-1
and bit-0 are also randomized based on an additional
secret-key shared between the legitimate users. As a
consequence, upon observing the transmitted signal in the
air, the attacker continues to have uncertainty about the
location of tone carrying the complementary bit, thereby
forcing it to execute wideband jamming. Unlike the case
of OOK, we show that BFSK is resilient even if the
attacker selectively executes the CA on the data symbols
and not on the pilots; this is because BFSK detection
does not rely on the distribution of received energy on
the pilots.
Henceforth, throughout the paper, we refer to the trans-
mitter, the receiver, and the attacker as Alice, Bob and
Eve, respectively. To model a power-constrained attacker, we
assume that Eve has θ times more energy than Alice, i.e.,
EEve = θEAlice, for some θ >> 1. This implies that as Alice
increases her energy to improve the performance, Eve can also
proportionately increase her energy. Furthermore, out ofEEve,
Eve may use only a fraction of it, say EEve,C = αEEve, for
some 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, on the CA. Thus, the key attack parameters
of this paper are θ >> 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
II. CONVOLUTION ATTACK ON FREQUENCY-HOPPING
Consider an FH based amplitude-modulated communica-
tion scheme between Alice and Bob, wherein the carrier-
frequency fc of the transmitted narrowband signal is ran-
domly chosen from one of the N tones, denoted by the set
F = {f1, f2, . . . , fN}. Let Alice use a root raised cosine
(RRC) waveform [8], denoted by g(t), as the baseband signal
of bandwidthW Hz and symbol rate T seconds. Furthermore,
let {xk = xI,k + ıxQ,k | k = 0, 1, 2, . . .}, with ı =
√−1,
denote the sequence of complex symbols, where xk takes
value from a 2-dimensional finite complex constellation, e.g.
quadrature amplitude modulation. The corresponding train of
baseband signals is given by
sb(t) =
∑
k
√
EAlicexkg(t− kT ), (1)
where EAlice is the average transmit energy by Alice as-
suming that xk and g(t) are appropriately normalized. After
modulating sb(t) on carrier-frequency fc ∈ F, the transmitted
passband signal is of the form
s(t) = R
(
sb(t)e
2piıfct
)
. (2)
where R(·) denotes the real part of a complex number. The
set F is chosen such that |fi−fi+1| > W , for 1 ≤ i ≤ N−1,
thereby leaving sufficient guard-band to mitigate inter-carrier
interference. Alice employs a carrier-frequency fc ∈ F for
Thop = mT seconds, for some integerm > 0, before hopping
to another value in F. Meanwhile, Bob synchronously hops
across the same sequence of carrier-frequencies every Thop
seconds, as the hopping pattern is generated using a shared
secret key. Throughout the paper, we use small values ofm by
assuming that Alice and Bob are capable of quickly switching
the carrier-frequencies with minimal losses due to transients
in the transmit and receive RRC filters. Otherwise, with
m >> 1, a sophisticated attacker can sense the narrowband
of communication and subsequently inject jamming energy
on the detected band, akin to traditional jamming. Thus,
small values of m helps the legitimate users to mitigate
standard jamming attacks on frequency-hopping. The discrete-
time version of the received baseband signal at Bob is given
by
yk(fc) =
√
EAliceh
(AB)
k (fc)xk + n
(B)
k (fc), (3)
for k = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1, where h(AB)k (fc) is the complex
channel gain on the tone fc, and n
(B)
k (fc) is the additive
noise at Bob, distributed as CN(0, σ2Bob). A complex random
variable g ∼ CN(0, σ2) is said to be circularly symmetric
Gaussian distributed when the real and imaginary components
of g are Gaussian and i.i.d. with mean 0 and variance σ
2
2 . We
assume that the channel h
(AB)
k (fc) remains fixed within the
hopping interval, i.e., h
(AB)
k (fc) = h
(AB)(fc), 0 ≤ k ≤ m−1.
For brevity, henceforth, we drop the reference to the carrier-
frequency fc from the channel model in (3).
We assume that Eve is positioned somewhere between Alice
and Bob, and she is not aware of the secret key used to
generate the hopping pattern. At any point in time, due to
the non-deterministic hopping pattern, Eve cannot successfully
guess the active carrier-frequency with probability one, and
therefore narrowband jamming on a random carrier-frequency
in F does not guarantee degraded error performance.
Keeping in view practical hurdles in executing wideband
jamming by a power-constrained attacker, we envision a new
attack, referred to as the convolution attack, which is as
depicted in Fig. 1. We assume that Eve is capable of receiving
and transmitting signals in the entire wideband covering all
the N carrier-frequencies. Through the CA, we show that
Eve can modify the transmitted narrowband signal despite not
knowing the active carrier-frequency. We draw our inspiration
from the fact that analogue processing of narrowband signals
is feasible in negligible amount of time [23]. In the proposed
attack, Eve multiples the received passband signal with a
random baseband signal, denoted by w(t), in the analogue
domain, and then forwards it to Bob. This multiplication
operation in the time-domain is equivalent to convolving the
Fourier transform of the received signal with that of the
random signal. Because of this operation, Eve can modify
the narrowband signal without knowing the carrier-frequency.
Subsequently, this modified version of the signal is added
to the signal arriving directly from Alice, thus corrupting
the overall received signal in the narrowband of interest. We
make the following assumptions for executing the CA: (i)
Negligible processing-delay at Eve, (ii) Negligible path-delay
through Eve, and (iii) Full-duplex architecture with perfect
cancellation at Eve.
In the next subsection, we mathematically describe how the
forwarded signals from Eve affect the received signal at Bob.
A. Signal Model with Convolution Attack
Since Eve does not know the active carrier-frequency, she
receives signals in the entire band, covering all the N carrier-
frequencies. Specifically, the received signal is given by
r(t) =
∑
i
a
(AE)
i s(t− τ (AE)i ) + z(t),
where i denotes the i-th multipath component from Alice
to Eve, and a
(AE)
i and τ
(AE)
i , respectively denote the cor-
responding amplitude and delay associated with the multipath
component. Once Alice and Bob are locked onto a carrier-
frequency, we assume that the rest of the N − 1 narrowbands
are unused by other users in the network, and therefore, the
non-signal component of r(t) constitutes only the additive
noise at Eve. In general, when the N narrowbands are shared
among several users in the network, the received signal r(t)
also constitutes interference from other users. Although Eve
receives over a wide band of frequencies, we assume that the
channel from Alice to Eve is frequency-flat over the active
narrowband. Upon receiving r(t), Eve multiplies it by a real
random signal w(t) (of unit average-energy over the symbol-
period), and then transmits
e(t) =
√
αθr(t)w(t), (4)
where
√
αθ is the gain introduced by Eve for some θ >>
1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The product operation r(t)w(t) can be
viewed as a way of introducing Doppler shifts to the passband
signal by various frequency components of w(t). With e(t)
transmitted from Eve, the received signal at Bob is given by
y(t) =
∑
j
b
(EB)
j e(t− τ (EB)j − tp)
+
∑
q
c(AB)q s(t− τ (AB)q ) + n(t), (5)
where the first part is contributed by Eve, the second part
comes directly from Alice, and the last part n(t) is the
ambient noise generated at Bob’s receiver. In (5), b
(EB)
j
and τ
(EB)
j , respectively denote the amplitude and the delay
associated with the j-th multipath component from Eve to
Bob. Similarly, c
(AB)
q and τ
(AB)
q , respectively denote the
amplitude and the delay associated with the q-th multipath
component from Alice to Bob. Also, note that tp is the
processing-delay introduced by Eve when multiplying the
two signals. Among the multipath components from Alice to
Bob, let τABf denote the first significant multipath component.
Similarly, among the multipath components from Alice to Eve,
and Eve to Bob, let τAEf and τ
EB
f denote the first significant
multipath components, respectively. In the proposed attack,
Eve positions herself such that the following condition on
delay is satisfied:
τ
(AB)
f < τ
(AE)
f + tp + τ
(EB)
f < τ
(AB)
f + T. (6)
If the timing constraint in (6) is satisfied, then it is straightfor-
ward to verify that Eve’s signal w(t) can modify the current
symbol in the air. After downconverting the received signal
y(t) from the carrier-frequency fc ∈ F, and then sampling and
filtering, we obtain the discrete-time version of the baseband
received signal, given by
yk =
√
EAliceh
(AB)
k xk +
Lk−1∑
l=0
h
(AEB)
k,l
√
αθEAlicexk−l
+
√
αθn
(EB)
k + n
(B)
k , (7)
for k = 0, 1, . . . ,m − 1, where {h(AEB)k,l | 1 ≤ l ≤ Lk} are
the complex channels contributed by Eve, n
(EB)
k is the noise
component forwarded by Eve, and n
(B)
k is the additive noise
at Bob. The channel contributed by Eve is possibly frequency-
selective, where the number of taps of the channel, denoted
by Lk, depends on the chosen waveform w(t). Intuitively, as
depicted in Fig. 1, although the channel from Alice to Eve,
and Eve to Bob are frequency-flat within a narrowband of W
Hz, the convolution operation in the frequency domain can
disrupt the frequency-flat structure, thereby giving rise to a
frequency-selective channel.
Observe that Eve is not injecting noise into the narrow-
band of interest, instead she is instantaneously modifying the
transmitted symbols by a random quantity, which is some
complex function of (i) the channel from Alice to Eve, (ii)
the signal w(t), and (iii) the channel from Eve to Bob. If
the timing constraint in (6) is not satisfied, then the signal
forwarded by the attacker does not modify the current symbol
in the air, instead it reaches Bob in the subsequent symbol-
periods. This implies that h
(AEB)
k,0 = 0 in (7). Although this
form of attack continues to affect the signal-to-noise-ratio of
subsequent symbols, the current symbol in the air does not get
modified. A straightforward way for Alice and Bob to evade
this attack is by locking to a given carrier-frequency for just
one symbol before hopping to another carrier-frequency in F.
Thus, satisfying the timing constraint in (6) is crucial for Eve
to execute the CA when the legitimate users have the potential
to hop carrier-frequencies with m = 1.
III. CHALLENGES IN MITIGATING CONVOLUTION ATTACK
Without the attack, i.e., h
(AEB)
k,l = 0, ∀k, l, the complex
channel h
(AB)
k is determined only by the environment. Impor-
tantly, the coherence-time of the channel h
(AB)
k is determined
only by the relative velocity of the surrounding objects in the
environment. However, with attack, an additional signal com-
ponent
∑Lk−1
l=0 h
(AEB)
k,l xk−l is added to the received signal at
Bob as shown in (7). A naive way to handle this additional
term is by considering it as noise. However, this will naturally
lower the signal-to-noise-ratio (SINR), and degrade the error
performance when Eve’s power is dominant. Instead, since
the additional component contains useful information, it is
prudent for Bob to treat it as the signal term in the decoding
process. After incorporating Eve’s signals in the decoding
process, Bob is forced to view an equivalent channel model,
given by
√
EAliceh
(AB)
k xk +
Lk−1∑
l=0
h
(AEB)
k,l
√
αθEAlicexk−l. (8)
Although Eve is contributing additional signal power into the
system, Bob is unsure of how to use this additional power
as it may rapidly change every symbol. We now summarize
the major changes introduced in the channel model when Eve
executes CA with significant power compared to that at Alice:
(i) Since w(t) can be arbitrarily chosen by Eve, the equivalent
channel can be frequency-selective despite using narrowband
for communication. (ii) Unlike in traditional channels, the
delay-spread of the equivalent frequency-selective channel
may change each symbol since w(t) could be composed of
arbitrary segment of signals every T seconds, and finally,
(iii) the coherence-time of the equivalent channel can also
be controlled by Eve, to the extent that the channel seen
across two successive symbols can be uncorrelated. It is worth
emphasizing that Eve is able to force abrupt variations in two
fundamental characteristics of the channel, namely: frequency-
selectivity and Doppler-spread. To bring in these variations,
it is necessary for Eve to spend significant power compared
to Alice, otherwise the characteristics of the true wireless
channel will continue to dominate, and as a result the attack
will be ineffective.
From the model in (8), it seems that Alice and Bob can
circumvent the CA by employing encoding and decoding
mechanisms that do not rely on the knowledge of channel
state information (CSI), such as differential-encoding methods
and blind detection techniques [29], [30]. However, these
methods work under the assumption that some statistics of
the channel remain constant for several blocks, and are also
known at the receiver. In the case of CA, these techniques
are not directly applicable as w(t) is completely controlled by
Eve. In the case of frequency-selective equivalent channel, the
delayed components are contributed only by Eve as the main
channel is frequency-flat due to the narrowband assumption.
A straightforward way to handle frequency-selectivity is by
using OFDM as the modulation scheme. However, the idea
of OFDM modulation requires the channel realizations to be
fixed for at least one OFDM symbol, and this assumption can
also be violated by Eve. Therefore, OFDM is not applicable
in this attack scenario.
A. Impact of Convolution Attack
To showcase the impact of CA, we consider a Binary Phase
Shift Keying (BPSK) signalling scheme at Alice aided by co-
herent maximum-likelihood detection at Bob. We present the
error-performance of this scheme under the following attacks:
(i) Narrowband jamming (NJ): Eve executes narrowband
jamming by injecting noise of energy Eeve = θEAlice, with
θ = 9, on one of the N = 1024 bands with uniform distri-
bution, (ii) Wideband Jamming (WJ): Eve executes wideband
jamming by uniformly dividing its energy Eeve = θEAlice,
with θ = 9, across the N = 1024 narrowbands, and (iii)
Convolution attack (CA): Eve executes CA to result in a
rapid-fading frequency-flat equivalent channel, with α = 1
and θ = 9. The equivalent channel on each carrier, denoted
by
√
EAliceh
(AB)
k +
√
EAliceαθh
(AEB)
k , changes rapidly to
force error-floor behaviour on coherent maximum-likelihood
detection. For the experiments, we use σ2Bob = 1 and
σ2Eve = 0.01. In Fig. 2, we plot the bit-error-rate (BER)
curves of the above schemes against Eb
N0
= EAlice
2σ2
Bob
when Bob
is equipped with Nr = 2 and Nr = 10 receive antennas. The
plots show that neither narrowband jamming nor wideband
jamming is effective in degrading the error-performance at
Bob, whereas CA can force severe BER degradation at an
attack-ignorant Bob. Thus, even with large values of N , it is
important for Alice and Bob to identify CA, and then mitigate
it by employing an appropriate countermeasure.
IV. CONVOLUTION ATTACK ON FH BASED ON-OFF
KEYING
We study an FH system with non-coherent On-Off Keying
(OOK) as the modulation scheme. In this strategy, Alice
communicates bit-1 by transmitting a signal of energy EAlice
(referred to as ON state), and bit-0 by switching-off the
yk =
{ √
EAliceh
(AB)
k +
√
αθEAliceh
(AEB)
k +
√
αθn
(EB)
k + n
(B)
k , if bk = 1;√
αθn
(EB)
k + n
(B)
k , Otherwise.
, (9)
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Fig. 2. Impact of CA, Narrowband Jamming and Wideband Jamming on an
FH-based communication with N = 1024 carrier frequencies. Binary Phase
Shift Keying (BPSK) signalling scheme is used at Alice aided by coherent
maximum-likelihood detection at Bob
communication (referred to as OFF state). For exposition,
let bk denote the bit transmitted at the k-th time instant. To
communicate bk, Alice encodes it as
xk =
{
1, if bk = 1;
0, otherwise,
(10)
before transmitting xk on the carrier-frequency fk ∈ F. From
the nature of the attack, it is clear that Eve forwards only
the noise component in the active narrowband when Alice
switches-off her transmitter. However, when Alice transmits
bit-1, Eve forwards significant signal power in the active
narrowband. With this signal design, Bob can distinguish
bit-1 and bit-0 by measuring the received energy on each
symbol without the knowledge of the channel. In the rest of
this paper, we assume that Eve uses w(t) which results in a
frequency-flat equivalent channel at Bob. For the frequency-
selective case, Alice and Bob may handle it by locking onto a
carrier-frequency fc only for one symbol, i.e., m = 1, so that
Bob may continue to listen to the preceding set of carrier-
frequencies for the delayed components. Our inferences on
the attack-strategies and countermeasures are only based on
the frequency-flat equivalent channel model. Since the users
can handle frequency-selectivity by hopping across the carrier-
frequencies for one symbol, we do not expect significant
deviations in the inferences with the frequency-selective case.
Applying OOK on the frequency-flat model, the received
symbol at Bob is given in (9) (top of this page), where
√
αθ
is the gain applied by Eve on its received signal. Based on the
nature of operations at Eve, we model the complex channel
h
(AEB)
k as h
(AEB)
k , h
(AE)
k wkh
(EB)
k , where h
(AE)
k is the
channel from Alice to Eve, distributed as CN(0, 1), h
(EB)
k is
the channel from Eve to Bob, distributed as CN(0, 1), and wk
is a complex random variable of mean zero and unit variance
obtained from the waveform w(t). The forwarded additive
noise from Eve is n
(EB)
k , h
(EB)
k wkn
(E)
k , where n
(B)
k is
distributed as CN(0, σ2Eve). Henceforth, we denote αθEAlice
as EEve,C , which is the additional signal energy contributed
by Eve through CA.
At the receiver side, Bob decodes to an estimate of bk,
denoted by bˆk, based on the following rule:
bˆk =
{
1, if |yk|2 > Eth;
0, Otherwise.
, (11)
where Eth is an appropriately designed threshold chosen
based on the noise component in (9). One of the challenges
in designing OOK against the CA is the derivation of the
threshold Eth, as fading characteristics of h
(AB)
k and h
(AEB)
k
have to be considered. We address the choice of Eth in Section
IV-C.
When decoding OOK, Bob faces two types of error events:
(i) bˆk = 1 when bk = 0, and (ii) bˆk = 0 when bk = 1. While
the former event may occur when the threshold Eth is lower
than the noise components jointly contributed by Eve and Bob,
the latter event captures the case when Eve attempts to force
the effective channel
√
EAliceh
(AB)
k +
√
αθEAliceh
(AEB)
k to
deep fade, i.e., |yk|2 ≤ Eth. We represent the associated
probability as P
(attack)
1→0 . In the following section, we propose
a mitigation strategy by Bob to reduce P
(attack)
1→0 .
A. Mitigation Strategy: Large Number of Receive Antennas
In the case of CA, since w(t) is completely controlled
by Eve, the distribution of the equivalent channel can be
changed to affect P
(attack)
1→0 provided EEve,C >> EAlice.
However, on the defense-side, since the two users hop across
a wide range of narrowbands, Eve cannot learn the narrow-
band, and therefore, she cannot drive the equivalent channel√
EAliceh
(AB)
k +
√
EEve,Ch
(AEB)
k to deep fade with proba-
bility one. As a defense mechanism to counter Eve’s strategy,
Bob should collect energy from as many independent paths
as possible. One such bandwidth-efficient way is to employ
multiple receive antennas at Bob. This way, the probability
that Eve can drive all the independent channels simultaneously
to deep fade can be reduced. If we use Nr to denote the
number of receive antennas at Bob, without additive-noise
at Eve and Bob, the total signal energy collected across Nr
antennas is given by
R
(attack)
Nr,k
,
Nr∑
j=1
∣∣∣√EAliceh(AB)k,j +√EEve,Ch(AE)k wkh(EB)k,j ∣∣∣2 ,
(12)
where h
(AB)
k,j and h
(EB)
k,j denote the equivalent channels seen
by the j-th antenna of Bob on the k-th symbol. In the event
of no attack, we have wk = 0, and R
(no−attack)
Nr,k
, given by
R
(no−attack)
Nr,k
,
Nr∑
j=1
∣∣∣√EAliceh(AB)k,j ∣∣∣2 , (13)
is Chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom 2Nr. How-
ever, with attack, the error-performance depends on the dis-
tribution of R
(attack)
Nr,k
given in (12), which in turn depends
on the distribution of wk. When Nr is large, the following
proposition shows that Eve’s additional energy can be used
to Bob’s advantage to accumulate more energy. Although this
result seems to suggest that CA is aiding Bob to improve the
error-performance, it is important to note that this relative
improvement is with respect to non-coherent OOK, which
is already sub-optimal compared to coherent ML detection
techniques.
Proposition 1: Let R∆ , R
(attack)
Nr,k
− R(no−attack)Nr,k , where
R
(attack)
Nr,k
and R
(attack)
Nr,k
are as given in (12) and (13), respec-
tively. For a small ǫ > 0, there exists N¯r such that for all
Nr ≥ N¯r, we have
Prob
(
R∆
Nr
> −ǫ
)
> 1− ǫ. (19)
Proof: We start by expanding R
(attack)
Nr,k
as in (14), where∑Nr
j=1 |
√
EAliceh
(AB)
k,j |2 is the energy accumulated at Bob
without the attack. As a result, Prob
(
R∆
Nr
> −ǫ
)
can be
written as in (15). Since
∑Nr
j=1 |
√
EEve,Ch
(AE)
k wkh
(EB)
k,j |2 is
strictly non-negative, the probability in (15) is lower-bounded
by (16). This is because we are only considering the events
when
1
Nr
Nr∑
j=1
(√
EAliceEEve,C2R
(
h
∗(AB)
k,j h
(AE)
k wkh
(EB)
k,j
))
is bounded in the interval (−ǫ, ǫ). Furthermore, the ran-
dom variables
{
R
(
h
∗(AB)
k,j h
(AE)
k wkh
(EB)
k,j
)
| 1 ≤ j ≤ Nr
}
are i.i.d. with mean zero since h
(AE)
k and wk are constants.
As a result, we rewrite (16) as (17). Finally, applying weak
law of large numbers [32, Chapter 3] on (17), we get (18) for
sufficiently large Nr ≥ N¯r. This completes the proof.
With massive MIMO in contention for next-generation
networks (e.g. 5G), base-stations equipped with hundreds of
antennas are likely to be deployed in practice [31]. This
implies that Proposition 1 is useful when base-station plays
the role of Bob and a UE (user-equipment) plays the role of
Alice.
While the above proposition shows the advantage of em-
ploying large number of receive antennas to combat the
CA, in the rest of this section, we present numerical results
to understand the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
R
(attack)
Nr,k
when Nr is not large. To generate the numerical
results, we assume that the channels h
(AB)
k,j , h
(AE)
k and h
(EB)
k,j
are i.i.d., and are distributed as CN(0, 1). We also assume that
wk is distributed as CN(0, 1). When the transmitted bit is 1,
let Etotal = EAlice +EEve,C be the average received energy
at every antenna of Bob, out of which, EEve,C be the signal
energy contributed by Eve. We define
η ,
EEve,C
Etotal
× 100, (20)
as the percentage of average energy contributed by Eve when
the transmitted bit is 1. In Fig. 3, we plot the CDFs of the
random variable
R
(attack)
Nr,k
Nr
when wk is Gaussian distributed.
For computing the CDFs, we use Etotal = 1. The plots in
Fig. 3 show that as Nr increases, the CDFs shift towards right,
thereby driving the cross-over probability to lower values.
B. Effect of Multiple antennas at Eve
We acknowledge that Bob’s trick to garner energy for
detection comes from using multiple antennas. To keep the
comparison fair, we study the effect of CA when Eve is also
equipped with multiple antennas. Considering Nr = 1, the
total energy at Bob without additive noise at Alice and Bob
is given by∣∣∣∣∣
√
EAliceh
(AB)
k +
Ne∑
l=1
(√
αθEAlice
Ne
)
h
(EB)
k,l h
(AE)
k,l wk,l
∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
(24)
where Ne denotes the number of antennas at Eve, wk,l, which
is distributed as CN(0, 1), is the scalar used at the l-th antenna
of Eve, h
(EB)
k,l is the channel from the l-th antenna at Eve to
Bob, and h
(AE)
k,l is the channel from Alice to the l-th antenna
at Eve. In the case of single antenna at Eve, the energy at
Bob is∣∣∣√EAliceh(AB)k +√αθEAliceh(EB)k,1 h(AE)k,1 wk,1∣∣∣2 (25)
where the main difference between (24) and (25) is the
distribution of the random variables
Ne∑
l=1
1√
Ne
h
(EB)
k,l wk,lh
(AE)
k,l (26)
with Ne > 1 and with Ne = 1. With Ne > 1, since
(26) is the sum of product of three independent Gaus-
sian random variables, we have observed that the CDF of∣∣∣∑Nel=1 1√Neh(EB)k,l wk,lh(AE)k,l
∣∣∣2 grows much slower than that
of
∣∣∣h(EB)k,1 wk,1h(AE)k,1 ∣∣∣2, as shown in Fig. 4. As a result, for a
given Eth, the probability of decoding bit-1 as bit-0 decreases
when multiple antennas are used at Eve.
Furthermore, we compute the CDFs of the received energy
across the Nr antennas at Bob when Nr ≥ 1 and Eve uses the
following strategies: (i) single-antenna, (ii) multiple-antenna
with spatially randomized waveforms - {wk,l | 1 ≤ l ≤ Ne}
are independent, and (iii) multiple-antenna with spatially fixed
waveforms - {wk,l = wk | 1 ≤ l ≤ Ne}. To give advantage to
Eve, we have also considered the case when Ne = 2Nr. The
CDFs, which are presented in Fig. 5, highlight that employing
multiple antennas at Eve does not aggravate the attack effect
as multiple antennas assists Bob in receiving more energy
than the single-antenna case. Due to lack of closed-form
expressions on the CDFs of energy collected at Bob, we
R
(attack)
Nr ,k
=
Nr∑
j=1
(∣∣∣√EAliceh(AB)k,j ∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣√EEve,Ch(AE)k wkh(EB)k,j ∣∣∣2
)
+
Nr∑
j=1
(√
EAliceEEve,C2R
(
h
∗(AB)
k,j h
(AE)
k wkh
(EB)
k,j
))
(14)
Prob
(
R∆
Nr
> −ǫ
)
= Prob



 1
Nr

Nr∑
j=1
∣∣∣√EEve,Ch(AE)k wkh(EB)k,j
∣∣∣2 +
Nr∑
j=1
(√
EEve,CEAlice2R
(
h
∗(AB)
k,j
h
(AE)
k
wkh
(EB)
k,j
))

 > −ǫ

 (15)
Prob
(
R∆
Nr
> −ǫ
)
≥ Prob
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1Nr
Nr∑
j=1
(√
EAliceEEve,C2R
(
h
∗(AB)
k,j h
(AE)
k wkh
(EB)
k,j
))∣∣∣∣∣ < ǫ
)
(16)
= Prob
(∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
Nr
Nr∑
j=1
(√
EAliceEEve,C2R
(
h
∗(AB)
k,j h
(AE)
k wkh
(EB)
k,j
)))
− 0
∣∣∣∣∣ < ǫ
)
(17)
> 1− ǫ. (18)
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Fig. 3. CDFs of the average received energy across Nr antennas at Bob. The
parameter η, as given in (20), denotes the percentage of energy contributed
by Eve at Bob. The plots show that multiple receive antennas at Bob helps
to reduce the attack effect.
do not have concrete theoretical insights on this argument.
Nevertheless, based on the simulation results, we advocate the
use of single antenna at Eve and multiple antennas at Bob. In
Section IV-D, we also present the BER performance of OOK
with and without multiple antennas at Eve to reinforce this
observation.
C. Design of Threshold Eth
Having studied the energy distributions during the ON state
of OOK, we now address the computation of Eth in (11) to
optimize the error-performance at Bob. With CA, the signal
energy collected across Nr antennas during the ON state is
given by (21) (see the top of the next page), where h
(AB)
k,j and
h
(EB)
k,j denote the equivalent channels seen by the j-th antenna
of Bob on the k-th symbol. Similarly, energy collected during
the OFF state is
Ebit−0 =
Nr∑
j=1
∣∣∣√αθn(EB)k,j + n(B)k,j ∣∣∣2 . (27)
To determine the optimal threshold we need to solve
E∗th = argminEthProb(Ebit−1 ≤ Eth)+Prob(Ebit−0 > Eth),
(28)
which in turn requires Bob to measure the Probability Den-
sity Functions (PDFs) on Ebit−1 and Ebit−0. Towards that
direction, we assume that Bob can learn the distributions
empirically using pilots, which are periodically transmitted by
Alice. Note that the persistent nature of the CRFH attack helps
in measuring the energy distributions with attack, otherwise,
Bob is forced to employ threshold values based on the energy
distribution of
√
EAliceh
(AB)
k , which in turn degrades the
error-performance under convolution attack. From Ebit−1 and
Ebit−0, we observe that {h(AE)k wkh(EB)k,j | 1 ≤ j ≤ Nr}
are uncorrelated but not necessarily independent. Similarly,
the random variables {n(EB)k,j | 1 ≤ j ≤ Nr} are also
uncorrelated but not independent. Due to challenges in ob-
taining the closed-form expressions on the PDFs of Ebit−1
and Ebit−0, we approximate {h(AE)k wkh(EB)k,j | 1 ≤ j ≤ Nr}
to be statistically independent and Gaussian distributed as
CN(0, 1), and then arrive at a sub-optimal solution. Similarly,
{n(EB)k,j | 1 ≤ j ≤ Nr} is also assumed i.i.d., where each
n
(EB)
k,j is distributed as CN(0, σ
2
Eve). Using such approxima-
tions, the corresponding versions of received energy are given
by (22) and (23), where h˜
(AEB)
k,j and n˜
(EB)
k,j are Gaussian
distributed. We immediately note that E˜bit−1 can be written
as
E˜bit−1 =
1
2
(EAlice + EAliceαθ + αθσ
2
Eve + σ
2
Bob)χ1
where χ1 is Chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom
2Nr. Similarly, E˜bit−0 can be written as
E˜bit−0 =
1
2
(αθσ2Eve + σ
2
Bob)χ2
where χ2 is also a Chi-square distributed random variable with
degrees of freedom 2Nr. With this, the approximate solution,
henceforth denoted as E˜∗th, is computed as in (29), wherein
γ(·, ·) is the lower incomplete gamma function. Unlike the
optimal solution in (28), the solution in (29) can be obtained
using numerical methods on incomplete gamma function.
Ebit−1 =
Nr∑
j=1
∣∣∣√EAliceh(AB)k,j +√EEve,Ch(AE)k wkh(EB)k,j +√αθn(EB)k,j + n(B)k,j ∣∣∣2 (21)
E˜bit−1 =
Nr∑
j=1
∣∣∣√EAliceh(AB)k,j +√EEve,C h˜(AEB)k,j +√αθn˜(EB)k,j + n(B)k,j ∣∣∣2 (22)
E˜bit−0 =
Nr∑
j=1
∣∣∣√αθn˜(EB)k,j + n(B)k,j ∣∣∣2 (23)
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Fig. 4. CDFs of | · |2 of random variables in (26), where | · | denotes the
absolute value of a complex number. The plots indicate that using multiple
antennas at Eve changes the energy distribution at Bob.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Received Energy
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
CD
F
N
e
 = 1
N
e
 = N
r
, Spatially Randomized
N
e
 = 2N
r
, Spatially Randomized
N
e
 = N
r
, Spatially Fixed
N
e
 = 2N
r
, Spatially Fixed
Fig. 5. Comparison of CDFs of the average received energy across Nr
antennas at Bob for various strategies employed at Eve. For the results, we
fix Nr = 10 and η = 90%. The number of antennas at Eve is denoted by
Ne. The plots highlight that it is better for Eve to equip only one antenna in
order increase the attack effect.
-5 0 5 10 15 20
Eb/N0 in dB
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
B
ER
N
r
 = 2
NJ
CA - OOK
CA - OOK Gaussian Threshold
CA
-5 0 5 10 15 20
Eb/N0 in dB
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
B
ER
N
r
 = 10
NJ
CA - OOK
CA - OOK Gaussian Threshold
CA
Fig. 6. Error-performance of OOK against convolution attack (CA) on an
FH system with N = 128. Since the attack is persistent, Bob measures the
energy distributions during the attack to design the threshold E∗
th
. The choice
of E˜∗
th
, which is based on Gaussian approximation marginally degrades the
performance compared to that when using the optimal value E∗
th
.
-5 0 5 10 15 20
Eb/N0 in dB
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
B
ER
N
r
 = 2
Without attack
NJ
WJ
CA - OOK
CA - OOK Gaussian Threshold
CA
-5 0 5 10 15 20
Eb/N0 in dB
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
B
ER
N
r
 = 10
Without attack
NJ
WJ
CA - OOK
CA - OOK Gaussian Threshold
CA
Fig. 7. Error-performance of OOK against convolution attack (CA) on an
FH system with N = 1024. Since the attack is persistent, Bob measures the
energy distributions during the attack to design the thresholds E∗
th
and E˜∗
th
.
E˜∗th = argminEthProb
(
χ1 ≤ 2Eth
EAlice + EAliceαθ + αθσ2Eve + σ
2
Bob
)
+ Prob
(
χ2 >
2Eth
αθσ2Eve + σ
2
Bob
)
= argminEthγ
(
Nr,
Eth
EAlice + EAliceαθσ2Eve + αθ + σ
2
Bob
)
− γ
(
Nr,
Eth
αθσ2Eve + σ
2
Bob
)
(29)
D. Error-Performance of OOK Against Convolution Attack
In this section, we present simulation results on the error-
performance of OOK against the CA. To carry out the
experiments, we assume that the channels {h(AB)k,j (fc) | fc ∈
F} across the N narrowbands are statistically independent
and distributed as CN(0, 1). Similarly, the sets of channels
{h(AE)k (fc) | fc ∈ F} and {h(EB)k,j (fc) | fc ∈ F} are also i.i.d.
across the N narrowbands, and are distributed as CN(0, 1).
To showcase the effect of CA, we present the error-
performance of the non-coherent OOK scheme along with the
schemes discussed in Section III-A, namely, (i) Narrowband
jamming (NJ), and (ii) the CA, on binary phase shift keying
(BPSK) with coherent maximum-likelihood detection at Bob.
In Fig. 6, we plot the BER curves of the above schemes
against Eb
N0
= EAlice
2σ2
Bob
for Nr = 2 and Nr = 10. For CA
on OOK, we use two different threshold values for energy
detection, namely: E∗th in (28), and E˜
∗
th in (29), which are
computed based on the attack parameters. The plots show
that the Gaussian approximation to compute E˜∗th does not
result in significant loss in the error-performance. Moreover,
the error-performance of OOK is better than that of coherent
modulation method under the CA. Similar to the results in Fig.
6, we also present the BER curves of OOK with N = 1024 in
Fig. 7. The plots highlight that it is important for Alice and
Bob to identify the CA, and then mitigate it by employing
OOK based strategy.
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Fig. 8. Error-performance of OOK against CA when Eve is equipped with
multiple antennas. The plots show that the best attack strategy for Eve is to
mount just one antenna.
Finally, in Fig. 8, we present the error-performance of OOK
when Eve is equipped with multiple antennas, and when θ =
9, α = 100% and N = 1024. Similar to the observations
in Section IV-B, Fig. 8 confirms that multiple antennas at
Eve does not aggravate the attack effect. For the simulations,
the threshold values for energy detection are computed based
on the energy distribution during the ON and the OFF states
similar to the one in (28).
Remark 1: The error-performance of OOK, as presented
in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, captures the best-case results from the
perspective of Alice and Bob. This is attributed to the assump-
tion that Eve executes the convolution attack persistently on
both the pilot symbols and the data symbols with the same
parameters α and θ. However, when Eve selectively attacks
only the data symbols, then the corresponding estimate of
the threshold will be suboptimal, which in turn will result in
degraded performance.
E. Limitations of OOK against Wideband Jamming
In this section, we explore the idea of changing Eve’s strat-
egy to wideband jamming (WJ) once Alice and Bob switch
to OOK in response to CA. In WJ, Eve uniformly divides
her energy EEve = θEAlice across the N narrowbands. The
rationale behind this switch is to exploit lower threshold
values used for energy detection, thereby forcing Bob to
decode bit-0 as bit-1. We first capture the consequence of
an attack-ignorant detection in Fig. 9 (left-side), which shows
the BER performance of OOK when Eth is optimized based
on EAlice and σ
2
Bob. Since Eth is chosen based on EAlice, and
EAlice is much lower than EEve, BER increases with large
values of jamming energy; this is mainly contributed by the
error event of decoding bit-0 as bit-1. In the attack-aware case,
Bob measures the jamming energy using the pilots, and then
takes it into account when designing Eth (this is possible due
to the persistent nature of the attack). The error-performance
of such a strategy is also presented in Fig. 9 (right-side),
which shows that unlike the case of attack-ignorant detection,
the BER experiences error-floor behaviour when Eb/No is
large; this is because the threshold value linearly increases
with EAlice, thereby saturating the probability of decoding
bit-0 as bit-1, and vice versa. In summary, although OOK
mitigates CA, a combination of CA followed by WJ can result
in degraded error-performance at Bob when Eb/No is large.
V. CONVOLUTION ATTACK ON FH BASED FREQUENCY
SHIFT KEYING
In this section, we study the impact of CA on Binary-FSK
(BFSK) based FH scheme as an alternate countermeasure. We
have chosen BFSK as the modulation scheme as most military
and commercial frequency hopping systems use frequency
shift keying. Unlike the generic attack in Section II, the
objective of CRFH in this case is to create confusion at Bob
when decoding the BFSK modulated symbols. In this attack,
Eve uses an appropriate baseband signal w(t) to forward a
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Fig. 9. Error-performance of OOK against wideband jamming on an FH
system with N = 128 and N = 1024. We use θ = 9 to generate the results.
frequency-shifted version of the received passband signal so
that the tones carrying bit-0 and bit-1 have comparable energy
levels at Bob.
A. Signal Model for BFSK without Attack
At Alice, bit-1 is transmitted by using the carrier-frequency
fc+β, and bit-0 is transmitted by using the carrier-frequency
fc−β, for some fc ∈ F (given in Section II). We assume that
0 < β < ∆2 , where ∆ is the spacing between adjacent carrier-
frequencies. We use bk ∈ {0, 1} to denote the bit transmitted
at the k-th symbol-period, and b¯k to denote the complement
of bk. To communicate bk, Alice transmits the tone fk, given
by
fk =
{
fc + β, if bk = 1,
fc − β, otherwise, (30)
where fc is chosen based on the shared secret-key between
Alice and Bob. Overall, the total set of tones used by Alice
and Bob is T = {fi + β, fi − β, | i = 1, 2, . . . , N}. In this
model, we assume Ne = 1 and Nr = 1.
Without any attack, the received complex-baseband sym-
bols at Bob are of the form
yk,main =
√
EAliceh
(AB)
k + n
(B)
k,main, (31)
yk,side = n
(B)
k,side, (32)
where yk,main and yk,side are the symbols received on the
tones fc + β and fc − β depending on bk. When bit-1 is
transmitted, yk,main and yk,side correspond to the symbols
on the tones fc + β and fc − β, respectively. Similarly, when
bit-0 is transmitted, yk,main and yk,side correspond to the
symbols on the tones fc−β and fc+β, respectively. Here, the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) components n
(B)
k,main
and n
(B)
k,side are i.i.d. as CN(0, σ
2
Bob). Stitching the above
together, the received symbols on the tones fc+β and fc−β
are given by
yk(fc + β) =
{
yk,main, if bk = 1;
yk,side, otherwise.
(33)
yk(fc − β) =
{
yk,main, if bk = 0;
yk,side, otherwise.
(34)
In (33) and (34), we have assumed that the two tones fc − β
and fc+β experience identical channel realization (assuming
a large coherence-bandwidth).
B. Signal Model for BFSK with Attack
With CA, we assume that Eve has the knowledge of β,
and she chooses the waveform w(t) so that some energy is
added on the received tone fk ∈ T and also on the side-tones
fk + 2β and fk − 2β. Note that Eve does not know whether
fk is fc+β or fc−β, for some fc. Therefore, she uniformly
divides her energy on both the side-tones fk+2β and fk−2β
so that the attack is successful irrespective of the transmitted
bit. Assuming frequency-flat equivalent channel at Bob, the
received symbols under the CA are given by
yk,main =
√
EAliceh
(AB)
k +
√
αθEAliceh
(AEB)
k,main +
√
αθn
(EB)
k
+n
(B)
k,main, (35)
yk,side =
√
(1− α)θEAlice
2
h
(AEB)
k,side +
√
(1− α)θ
2
n
(EB)
k
+n
(B)
k,side, (36)
where
√
αθ and
√
(1−α)
2 θ are the gains applied by Eve on
the received tone and on either of the side-tones, respectively.
Based on the nature of operations at Eve, we model the
complex channels h
(AEB)
k,main and h
(AEB)
k,side as
h
(AEB)
k,main , h
(AE)
k wkh
(EB)
k and h
(AEB)
k,side , h
(AE)
k ukh
(EB)
k ,
respectively, where h
(AE)
k is the channel from Alice to Eve,
distributed as CN(0, 1), h
(EB)
k is the channel from Eve to Bob,
distributed as CN(0, 1), and wk and uk are the statistically
independent random variables obtained from the waveform
w(t). Similarly, the forwarded AWGN components from Eve
are n
(EB)
k,main , h
(EB)
k wkn
(E)
k and n
(EB)
k,side , h
(EB)
k ukn
(E)
k ,
where n
(E)
k is distributed as CN(0, σ
2
E). Henceforth, we de-
note αθEAlice and
(1−α)
2 θEAlice as EEve,main and EEve,side,
respectively.
To decode the information bits, Bob uses non-coherent
energy detection rule given by
bˆk =
{
1, if |yk(fc + β)|2 > |yk(fc − β)|2;
0, 0therwise.
, (37)
where bˆk denotes the estimate of bk, and yk(fc + β) and
yk(fc − β) are as given in (33) and (34), respectively.
C. Events Affecting Error-Performance at Bob
In the CA, Eve can vary her energy levels EEve,main
and EEve,side so that the energy levels of the main channel√
EAliceh
(AB)
k +
√
EEve,mainh
(AEB)
k,main and the side channel√
EEve,sideh
(AEB)
k,side are close enough to create confusion at
Bob. Since Alice and Bob hop across a wide range of nar-
rowbands, Eve cannot learn the narrowband instantaneously,
and therefore she cannot force the channel realizations to a
specific value with probability one. However, she can change
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Fig. 10. Numerically computed values of α that maximize the impact of the
attack. The best attack strategy is to pour higher energy on the side channels
as the main channel already contains energy contributed by Alice.
the distribution of the received energy on the tones fc+β and
fc−β at Bob by varying the value of α. Along that direction,
an interesting question is: What is the optimal value of α that
degrades the error-performance at Bob?
We now discuss the right choice of the parameter α from
the attacker’s perspective. With no additive-noise at Eve and
Bob, the received energy on the tone chosen by Alice is
Emain = EAlice
∣∣∣h(AB)k +√αθh(AE)k wkh(EB)k ∣∣∣2 . (38)
Similarly, the received energy on the complementary tone is
Eside = EAlice
∣∣∣∣∣
√
1− α
2
θh
(AE)
k ukh
(EB)
k
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (39)
Since Emain and Eside are random variables, the objective of
the attacker is to choose α such that
pcross , Prob(Emain > Eside) =
1
2
.
In other words, the objective is to drive the mutual in-
formation I(bk; bˆk) = 1 − H(pcross) = 0, where H(·)
is the entropy function. We have empirically computed the
mutual information values I(bk; bˆk) against various values of
α over an ensemble of realizations of the random variables
h
(AB)
k , h
(AE)
k , h
(EB)
k , wk and uk. To generate the numerical
results, we use EAlice = 1 and θ = 5, 9, 15. We assume
that wk and uk are independent and distributed as CN(0, 1).
The computed mutual information values are presented in
Fig. 10 as a function of α for several values of θ. The plots
suggest that the attack impact can be maximized by choosing
α = 0.1, 0.15, 0.2 for θ = 5, 9, 15, respectively. Note that
larger value of α decreases the cross-over probability, thereby
increasing the mutual information of the channel. Similarly,
values of α lower than the above optimal values increases the
cross-over probability more than 0.5, using which the receiver
can achieve cross-over probability less than 0.5 by flipping the
decoded bits on each symbol.
Since the density functions on Emain and Eside are not
analytically tractable, the following theorem provides closed-
form expressions on sub-optimal values of α by approximating
h
(AEB)
k,main and h
(AEB)
k,side to be Gaussian distributed.
Theorem 1: Under the assumption that h
(AEB)
k,main and h
(AEB)
k,side
are statistically independent complex Gaussian random vari-
ables, with σ2Eve = σ
2
Bob = 0, the optimal value of α (denoted
by α∗) which minimizes the mutual information I(bk; b¯k) is
θ−2
2θ .
Proof: In (38) and (39), the variables wk and uk
are statistically independent with zero mean and unit vari-
ance. We note that the random variables h
(AE)
k ukh
(EB)
k and
h
(AE)
k wkh
(EB)
k are uncorrelated but not statistically indepen-
dent. Furthermore, since the distribution on the product of the
three Gaussian random variables is not tractable, we seek to
obtain α by assuming that h
(AE)
k ukh
(EB)
k and h
(AE)
k wkh
(EB)
k
are Gaussian distributed and statistically independent. We
need to choose α such that Prob(Emain > Eside) = 0.5.
From (38) and (39), we note that EAlice is a common factor
in both Emain and Eside, and therefore, without loss of
generality, we assume EAlice = 1. In the rest of this proof,
we compute Prob(Emain > Eside) as a function of α and θ,
and subsequently obtain α that achieves cross-over probability
0.5. First, we compute Prob(Emain > Eside = eside), where
eside is a realization of the random variable Eside. Since
Emain is exponential distributed with mean (1 + αθ), the
above probability can be written as
Prob(Emain > Eside = eside) = e
−eside
1+αθ .
Replacing eside by
1−α
2 θ|h
(AEB)
side |2, we have
Prob
(
Emain >
(
1− α
2
)
θ|h(AEB)side |2
)
= e
−(( 1−α
2
)θ|h
(AEB)
side
|2)
1+αθ .
Finally, since |h(AEB)side |2 is also exponentially distributed, we
take the average of the above expression with respect to
|h(AEB)side |2 to obtain (40). In order to obtain the above prob-
ability to be 0.5, the variable α∗ must satisfy the constraint
α∗ = θ−22θ .
D. Simulation Results
In this section, we demonstrate the error-performance of
BFSK based FH under CA. To carry out the experiments,
we assume that the channels {h(AB)k,j (fc) | fc ∈ F} across
the N narrowbands are statistically independent and dis-
tributed as CN(0, 1). Similarly, {h(AE)k (fc) | fc ∈ F} and
{h(EB)k,j (fc) | fc ∈ F} are also i.i.d. as CN(0, 1) across the N
narrowbands.
To showcase the effect of CA, we present the error-
performance of: (i) BFSK based FH without attack and (ii)
BFSK based FH with CA. In the latter scheme, Eve executes
the CA with various values of α. Specifically, α fraction of the
total energy at Eve is used for corrupting the main channel,
while 1−α2 fraction of it is used to introduce additional energy
on either of the side-tones. We use θ = 9, i.e., as Alice
increases EAlice, Eve also increases EEve proportionately. For
the AWGN, we use σ2Bob = 1 and σ
2
Eve = 0.01. In Fig. 11,
E|h(AEB)
side
|2
(
Prob
(
Emain >
(
1− α
2
)
θ|h(AEB)side |2
))
=
2+ 2αθ
2 + αθ + θ
(40)
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Fig. 11. Error-performance of BFSK against CA for various values of α.
In the CA, α fraction of total energy at Eve is spent on received carrier-
frequency fk ,
1−α
2
fraction each on fk + 2β and fk − 2β. Interestingly,
α = 100% outperforms the no-attack case as Eve’s signals help Bob in
decoding.
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Eb/N0 in dB
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
B
ER
Without attack
 = 5,  = 0.1
 = 9,  = 0.15
 = 15,  = 0.2
 = 5, *
 = 9, *
 = 15, *
BER curves for
*
 values
Fig. 12. Error-performance of BFSK against CA when α is computed using
Gaussian assumptions on h
(AEB)
k,main
and h
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k,side
.
we plot the BER curves of the above two schemes against
Eb
N0
= EAlice
σ2
Bob
. The plots confirm our observations from the
previous section that it is a better strategy for Eve to use α
that ensures comparable energy levels on the two tones fc+β
and fc − β. In Fig. 12, we also plot the BER when closed-
form expression on α∗ (from Theorem 1) is used. The plots
show that although these values of α are not optimal, they
continue to result in degraded error-performance at Bob.
E. Mitigation Strategy: Enhanced BFSK
In the existing BFSK based FH scheme, randomness is
applied on the choice of the carrier-frequency fc ∈ F but
not on the choice of the tones fc + β and fc − β. This
implies, given fk at Eve, the tone on which bit-b¯k is encoded
is deterministic upto 1 bit of randomness, and this weakness
is specifically exploited by Eve during the CA. Therefore,
from the legitimate users’ perspective, they must obfuscate
the location of the tones fc + β and fc − β. This way, Eve
cannot introduce significant energy on the tone that carries bit-
b¯k. To achieve this mitigation strategy, we enable Alice and
Bob to share a secret-key using which the random positions of
the side-tones are determined. As a consequence, Eve cannot
learn their locations. Meanwhile, Bob’s strategy is to observe
the appropriate pair of tones, and then apply non-coherent
energy detection to decode the information bits.
Fig. 13. Pictorial representation of traditional BFSK (left-side) and enhanced
BFSK (right-side) with 8 carrier-frequencies and 4 time-slots. With EBFSK,
tone randomization helps in mitigating the CA on BFSK based FH.
We refer to the proposed mitigation strategy as Enhanced
BFSK (EBFSK), wherein a pair of tones is randomly chosen
from the set T based on a secret-key, and one of them is
used to communicate bit-1 and the other for bit-0. Since this
selection is based on a shared-key, Bob observes the symbols
on the chosen tones, and then decodes the information based
on the received energy. To illustrate the above idea, we use
the example depicted in Fig. 13. As shown on the left-hand
side of Fig. 13, traditional BFSK based FH randomizes only
the carrier-frequencies, while keeping the side-tones fixed. On
the other hand, the EBFSK scheme randomizes the side-tones
as shown on the right-hand side of Fig. 13. For instance, in
time-slot 4, bit-1 can be encoded on the tone f5−β and bit-0
can be encoded on the tone f1+β. With that mapping, when
the attacker instantaneously receives the signal on f5−β, she
does not know the location of the other tone which carries
bit-0. As a result, executing the CA given in Section V does
not guarantee degradation of error-performance at Bob.
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Fig. 14. Error-performance of Enhanced BFSK with tone randomization
(TR) against CA with α = 0.25. With EBFSK, tone randomization helps in
mitigating the CA on FH.
To demonstrate the impact of tone randomization, we
present the error-performance of: (i) CA on traditional FH
based BFSK: BFSK based FH is employed at Alice, wherein
only the carrier-frequencies are subject to randomization.
(ii) CA on Enhanced BFSK: BFSK based FH is employed
at Alice, wherein all the 2N tones of T are subject to
randomization. For the above two schemes, CA is executed as
described in Section V with α = 25%. In Fig. 14, we plot the
uncoded BER curves of the above schemes with N = 64 and
N = 1024. The plots show that tone randomization assists the
legitimate users in mitigating the CA. They also reinforce the
point that larger value of N helps in mitigating the CA. This
is because, given the tone for bit-bk, the probability that either
fk+2β or fk−2β is used for bit-b¯k is 12N−1 . In contrast, the
error-performance of traditional FH under CA does not depend
on N as the tones carrying bit-b¯k is deterministic upto 1 bit
randomness.
We now discuss a possible counter-strategy by Eve to
overcome the idea of tone randomization. In this strategy,
Eve distributes all her energy EEve = θEAlice on wideband
jamming. In Fig. 14, we also present the BER performance of
EBFSK against wideband jamming when θ = 9 for N = 64
and N = 1024. The plots show that the error-performance
degrades as Eb/No increases, and the degree of degradation
depends on the value of N . Similar to OOK signalling
scheme, BER of BFSK experiences error-floor behaviour with
increased jamming energy; this is because equal energy is
injected on tones carrying bit-0 and bit-1.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have proposed convolution attacks (CA) on FH based
wireless communication by full-duplex radios. We have shown
that the CA can convert a slow-fading channel between the
transmitter and the receiver to a rapid fading one, thereby
forbidding the users to apply amplitude-modulation based
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Fig. 15. Error-performance of OOK and BFSK against corresponding variants
of CA on an FH system with N = 1024.
signalling schemes. Subsequently, we have studied (i) FH-
based OOK and (ii) FH-based BFSK, as countermeasures to
mitigate the CA.
In this concluding section, we discuss some important ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the proposed countermeasures,
as listed in Table I. First, we compare the error-performance
of the proposed countermeasures against the corresponding
variants of CA when N = 1024. We have used Nr = 1, 2 at
Bob, and Ne = 1 at Eve. For the OOK scheme, Eve executes
the CA with α = 1 and θ = 9, whereas Bob employs non-
coherent energy detection to recover the bits. The threshold
values for energy detection are computed using the measured
energy distributions during the ON and the OFF states. For
the BFSK scheme, Eve uses α = 0.15 and θ = 9 so that
Bob witnesses comparable energy levels on both the tones.
As a countermeasure, Alice and Bob employ EBFSK wherein
the tones carrying bit-0 and bit-1 are randomized. When
comparing the two schemes, we note that BFSK has lower
spectral-efficiency than OOK. To keep the comparison fair,
the average transmit energy of the OOK scheme is increased
so as to keep the energy per bit constant between the two
schemes. We have presented the BER performance of the
two schemes in Fig. 15, which shows that the OOK scheme
marginally outperforms BFSK at lower values of Eb/No under
the attack, whereas the performance of the two schemes are
approximately same when Eb/No is high. In a nutshell, both
OOK and BFSK experience similar error-performance against
the CA with the exception that (i) BFSK has higher-overhead
than OOK as it needs additional shared-key to randomize the
tones carrying bit-1 and bit-0, and (ii) OOK requires Bob
to measure the energy distributions to determine the optimal
threshold E∗th, whereas BFSK does not. As a result, if the
CRFH attacker does not attack the pilot symbols, then BFSK
continues to be effective, whereas OOK may fail due to
mismatch between the estimated threshold value and the true
energy distributions during the attack.
When generalizing OOK to higher-order modulations, we
believe thatM -PAM (Pulse Amplitude Modulation) variant of
TABLE I
CONVOLUTION ATTACK ON OOK AND BFSK
Features On-Off Keying Binary Frequency Shift Keying
Attack objective Introduce deep fades Introduce comparable energy levels on tones carrying bit-0 and bit-1
Defense Use large number of receive antennas at Bob Use frequency-hopping with tone randomization
Shared keys Needed for frequency hopping Needed for tone randomization in addition to frequency-hopping
Wideband Jamming Error-floor behaviour at high SNR Error-floor behaviour at high SNR
Generalization to higher-order modulation Not effective Fffective
Measurement of energy distribution at Bob Needed to design E∗th Not needed
Pilot contamination by Eve Degrades the performance Resilient to pilot contamination
OOK for M > 2, will result in degraded error-performance
against CA. This is because, while symbol 0 can be detected
at Bob, distinguishing non-zero symbols will be a challenge
as fading is completely controlled by Eve. However, when
generalizing BFSK, we believe that both the attack as well as
the countermeasure can be generalized to higher-order FSK.
A. Directions for Future Research
For future work, we are interested in studying the impact
of convolution attack when the full-duplex radio at Eve
experiences imperfect self-interference cancellation. With this
constraint, we envisage memory property being introduced by
the attacker since the forwarded symbol at a given time-instant
will affect the subsequent symbols due to the leakage effect.
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